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Gertzman: A Primer on Private Offerings

NOTES
A PRIMER ON PRIVATE OFFERINGS*
The Securities Act of 19331 requires that securities, be registered before
being offered or sold through the mail or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 3 The purpose of this requirement is to insure disclosure
4
of all information that might be material for informed investment decisions.
Congress did not, however, consider it imperative to afford the public
the same degree of protection with regard to private placements of securities.5
Accordingly, these transactions were exempted from the provisions of the
Act. 6 The provisions of the Act are therefore inapplicable to "transactions
by an issuer 7 not involving any public offering."8 The term "public offering" is not defined by the Act, however, and subsequent judicial determinations of the exemption's availability have failed to provide a satisfactory
definition.
The purpose of this note is to analyze this troublesome exemption for the
benefit of the general practitioner unversed in the intricacies of securities
law. Purposes and benefits of the "private offering" exemption will be discussed in conjunction with the problems inherent in determining the availability of the exemption. Recent efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to resolve these problems will also be evaluated.
PURPOSES AND BENEFITS

The registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 were enacted
in order to protect the unsophisticated investor. Accordingly, Congress felt
NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
*EDTOR's
for the best student note submitted in the fall 1971 quarter.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§77a-aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act].
2. Securities Act §77b (1)defines "security" to include: "any note, stock, treasury stock,
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for
a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing."
3. Securities Act §77e.
4. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953). The Act was also intended to
curtail the deceptive practices utilized by those issuing securities and thereby to minimize
the possibility of a financial collapse similar to the one in 1929. Note, The InvestmentIntent Dilemma in Secondary Transactions, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1043 (1964).
5. See Steffen, Private Placements Should Be Registered, 43 N.C.L. REv. 548 (1965), for
the argument that all security transactions should be registered.
6. Securities Act §77d. In addition to the exemption from registration for private offerings,
transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer and certain transactions by dealers and brokers are exempt. Id.
7. Id. §77b (4). With certain exceptions "[t]he term 'issuer' means every person who
issues or proposes to issue any security .
8. Id. §77d (2).
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that registration was not needed in offerings involving a limited number of
sophisticated investors capable of fending for themselves. 9
The private offering exemption was originally intended to apply only
to small offerings of securities, those in which the securities were less likely
to be publicly offered even if redistributed. 0 Therefore, the exemption was
originally intended to apply to bank loans, private placements of securities
with large institutions, the promotion of a business venture by a few closely
related persons," and the financial expansion of small and medium-sized
firms.'

°

Over the years the private offering exemption gradually became the most
frequently used exemption. 1 3 Although accounting for less than 3 per cent
of all security sales prior to the enactment of the 1933 Act,14 approximately
55 per cent of the gross proceeds from the sales of securities in 1963 were
attributed to private offerings. 15 Private placements grew from $92 million
in 1934 to $6.4 billion in 1963.16
The most obvious benefit derived from a private offering is the avoidance
of registration and subsequent public disclosure. 17 A corollary benefit involves the limitation upon the type of information permitted in a registration. Since the SEC will not permit projections of future earnings to be
placed in a prospectus, the private offering may be the only effective means
of financing for a company whose strength lies in such projections. 8
Another significant benefit derived from a private offering is cost savings.
Costs of up to $200,000 may be incurred by a fledgling corporation in attempting to secure $1 million of capital. 9 Underwriters, for example, may
demand up to 10 per cent of the face value of the securities offered. Legal
9. H.R. REP. No. 75, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 15-16 (1933).
10. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
11. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
12. Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L. REv. 851, 853
(1959). For a study of the applicability of the private offering exemption to the sale of a
business see Shea, A PracticalLook at the Securities Laws Restrictions on Sales by Owners
of Unregistered Stock, 43 U. DEr. L.J. 571 (1966).
13. Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45 VA. L. REv. 869

(1959).
14. Richardson, The Private Placement Method of Financing,45 CmcAGo B. REcoaR

328

(1964).
15. 23 SEC Statistical Bull. 8 (Oct. 1964).
16. Id.

17. Securities Act §77a provides a schedule of items required in a registration state-

ment. The more important items include: the names and addresses of all directors, executives, financial and accounting officers; names and addresses of persons holding (beneficially
or otherwise) over 10% of any class of stock; the amount of stock held by the directors,
officers, et cetera; a statement of the capitalization of the corporation; the purposes for which
funds received from the issue are to be used; the salaries of officers and directors; proceeds
to be received from and expenses incurred in connection with the issue; financial statements
certified by public accountants; and the provisions of all material contracts not made in
the ordinary course of business.
18. Hershman, Private Placement: The "New" Money Game, in WHY, WHEN
To Go PuBLic 213 (G. Hutchison ed. 1970).

AND

How

19. Id. at 220.
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and accounting fees may run as high as $25,000. Another $15,000 in public
relations efforts may be incurred as well as an equal amount for other
miscellaneous costs including those incurred as a result of state blue sky
laws.20 By using a private offering a firm may be able to cut costs from 50
21
per cent to 75 per cent.
Many other benefits are available to private issuers in addition to the
attendant privacy and cost savings realized through private offerings. A
private offering of securities can be placed with greater speed and certainty
than a public offering. The time consumed by the preparation of a registration statement and the subsequent examination by the SEC may result in
a loss of favorable market conditions and thereby adversely affect or even
22
completely vitiate the proposed offering.
The private offering also affords greater flexibility in the contractual
terms of an issue. For example, the borrower 23 may draw the funds gradually as they are needed. In exchange for this right of deferral, the borrower
is usually charged a commitment fee of '/ to I per cent per annum of the
unborrowed balance.2 4 Despite this charge, however, the cost is usually less
than the alternative utilized in conjunction with public offerings - paying
full interest on the total amount of the issuance and then investing the unused funds in lower yielding Treasury Bills or certificates of deposit. 25
Additionally, the private issuer is afforded great facility in altering the
contractual terms of the issue if necessary. Thus, not only can the original
contract be adjusted to the needs of the issuer, but the lender can also
respond uniquely to the issuer's future requirements. 2 6 This flexibility is a
virtual impossibility with public offerings. In public offerings, because the
numerous holders of the issue are so geographically scattered and difficult
to locate, the possibility of a contractual adjustment favorable to all parties
27
is slight.
Moreover, the credit of a private issuer is often greatly enhanced by its
status as one that can finance its activities privately.2 8 The private offering
will also require less time and effort by the issuer's executives and financial
2 9
officers.

20.

Id.

21.

See Richardson, supra note 14, at 337.
J. COHEN 9: E. ZINBARG, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS

22.

AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT

699 (1967).

23. This assumes debt securities are issued. Approximately 80-85% of the total corporate issues in recent years, private and public, consisted of bond offerings. Of these, almost

50% were placed privately. Id. at 53.
24. Id. at 699.
25. Id. at 700.
26.

This flexibility has resulted in

the development

of several

new forms of loans.

Prime examples include oil production loans, gas transmission loans, and loans guaranteed
by leases. Cohan, Should Direct Placements Be Registered?, 43 N.C.L. REv. 298, 303 (1965).
27. Richardson, supra note 14, at 334.
28. Id. at 333. This is especially true when it becomes known that a sophisticated investor such as an insurance company has seen fit to invest in the issuer's securities.

29. Id. at 334.
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For these reasons, private offerings have found favor with large corporations as well as the small issuer for whom the exemption was originally intended. Such firms as American Motors, Chrysler, IBM, and City Investing
30
have used private placements as a means of providing capital.
The benefits of the private offering exemption do not accrue solely to
the issuer. Large insurance companies, which own approximately 75 per cent
of all outstanding private placements,31 also benefit from the exemption.
Because the issuer's costs are reduced by the private offering, it is willing to
pay a higher interest rate charged by institutional lenders. 32 Moreover, in
addition to enlarged interest income, the institutional investors benefit by
being able to place large blocks of investment funds in a relatively small
number of issues, thus reducing the unit cost of security analysis and followup. 3 3
While many benefits of the private offering exemption have caused the
private offering to find favor with both the large and small issuer, pitfalls
do exist.
THE PROBLEMS

The problems of determining the availability of the exemption may be
categorized generally as involving one of two questions: Who may qualify
as offerees and, assuming that offerees of privately issued securities are
properly selected, when and under what circumstances may they sell?
In the 1933 Act Congress failed either to define or limit the scope of the
term "private offering." Thus, it remained for judicial and administrative
bodies to develop a sufficient guide to advise issuers as to the necessity of
registration. The first administrative construction of the exemption appeared in a 1935 opinion of the SEC General Counsel.- That opinion
emphasized that the determination of what constituted a public offering was
a question of fact to be decided after consideration of all the circumstances
surrounding the issuance.35 The determination of the exemption's availability thus depends upon a multitude of factors.
The Offerees
Offerees as Distinguished from Purchasers. The relevant considerations
of any inquiry concerning a private placement concern the offerees of an
issue, not the actual purchasers.3 6 The term "offerees" in this sense is not
limited to those submitting formal proposals to accept securities. 37 Offerees
30. Hershman, supra note 18, at 214. See also J.
254 (1966).
31. J. COHEN & E. ZINBARG, supra note 22, at 698.
32. Id. at 700.

COHEN

& S. ROBBINS,

THE FINANCIAL

MANAGER

33.
34.

Id.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).

35. Id. This position was reaffirmed by later interpretations and case law. See, e.g.,
Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963).
36. Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan, 52 F. Supp. 999 (D. Del. 1943).
37. Id. at 1002. In SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935), the SEC stated:
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constitute any class of persons with whom conversations or negotiations
regarding a possible purchase of securities take place, including those to
whom any form of general solicitations are directed. 3 Those who expect to
rely on the private offering exemption should therefore strictly regulate
all means by which they seek to dispose of their securities. Precautions
should be taken to avoid solicitations to or offers from individuals whose
inclusion in the class of offerees may preclude the exemption's availability. 39
The Number of Offerees. While Congress did not define "private offering"
or establish any test for determining the exemption's applicability, the intent
to utilize a numerical test could be inferred from the legislative history of
the Act. House of Representatives' committee reports stated that the exemption permits "an issuer to make a specific or an isolated sale of its
securities to a particular person" 40 and "[s]ales of stock to stockholders become subject to the Act unless the stockholders are so small in number that
the sale to them does not constitute a public offering."41 In its first release
on the subject, however, the SEC sought to dispel the conclusion that the
number of offerees was determinative. 42 On the other hand, the SEC did
indicate that under ordinary circumstances offerings to fewer than twentyfive persons would be presumed not to involve a public offering.43 On the
basis of this pronouncement, most securities practitioners assumed that
44
offerings to fewer than twenty-five persons would always be deemed private.
This assumption, however, was shattered by SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.45
In Ralston the United States Supreme Court stated that although the
SEC had deemed the exemption inapplicable whenever a large number of
offerees was involved, the statute would seem to apply to a public offering

"Any attempt to dispose of a security should be regarded as an offer."
38. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
39. Issuers must be extremely careful in all their actions related to a private offering.

Should the exemption prove inapplicable an issuer is subject to a purchaser's right of rescission, including recovery of interest on the consideration paid. Securities Act §771. Additionally, the Securities Act provides for injunctions against the issuer, id. §77t, and
penalties for willful violations of the Act, id. §77x.
40. H.R. REP. No. 85, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 16 (1933).
41. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 25 (1933). On the basis of these reports
one court concluded that any offering to stockholders, other than to a very small number,
would be public regardless of the offerees' need for the protections afforded by registration.
It therefore implicitly adopted a quantity test. See SEC v. Sunbeam Cold Mines Co., 95
F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1938).

42. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935). This release stated: "In no
sense is the question [of the public nature of the offering] to be determined exclusively
by the number of prospective offerees." It should be noted that interpretations and rulings
by the SEC are usually given great weight. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking
Ass'n, Inc., 810 U.S. 534 (1940); Cambell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951);
Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).

43. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
44. Morrow, The Investment Letter Dilemma and Proposed Rule 144: A Retreat to
Confusion, 11 SANTA CLARA LAw. 37, 39 (1970).
45. 846 U.S. 119 (1953).
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irrespective of the number of offerees. 46 The Court pointed out, however,
that nothing in the statutory language would prevent the SEC, in enforcing
the statute, from using a numerical test in deciding when to investigate particular exemption claims. 47 Nevertheless, the Court contended that there
was no justification for superimposing a quantity limit on private offerings. 41
Although other courts have held that the Supreme Court clearly rejected
a quantity limit in construing the exemption, 49 an examination of both civil
actions and administrative proceedings indicates that many offerings continue to be made in reliance upon the small number of offerees involved.50
In many cases such reliance has proved disastrous. For example, in In re
Dempsey & Co.51 the SEC stated that an assertion that an offering to a small
group was a private offering ignored the effect of Ralston. Thus, the claimant failed to convince the SEC of the exemption's applicability to its limited
offering.
Generally, the courts have also followed the letter of Ralston and have
disallowed the exemption in offerings made to as few as nine 52 or even one
person. 53 On the other hand, a factual issue was deemed to be presented
where approximately 300 offerees were involved. 54
Therefore, practitioners must accept the fact that the number of offerees
is not determinative of the exemption's applicability. It is only one factor
that will be subject to administrative or judicial consideration. 5 5

46. Id. at 124. The Court cited Viscount Sumner's dictum in Nash v. Lynde, 1929 A.C.
158, 169 (P.C.), that:"The public ... is of course a general word. No particular numbers
are prescribed. Anything from two to infinity may serve: perhaps even one .....
Id. at
125 n.11.
47. Id. at 125.
48.

Id.

49. E.g., Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
896 (1959); Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959).
50. 2 S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED SECuarriEs §2.3 (e) at 2-29
(1971). A contributing factor to this unfounded reliance has been the language employed
by the courts. See Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880, 884 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967); Collier v.
Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D. Minn. 1958), where the courts indicated
that in ordinary circumstances offerings to not more than 25 or 30 offerees would be private.
51. 39 S.E.C. 371 (1958). Petitioner failed to convince the SEC that its offering of
$4 million of debentures to fewer than 25 persons was private. See also SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5690 (May 7, 1958).
52. See Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898 (D. Colo. 1959) (issuance of oil and gas
leases to nine persons held to be a public offering).
53. See Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
794 (1943) (issuance of stock to corporation's president in repayment of loan held to be
a public offering).
54. Knapp v. Kinsey, 154 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Mich.), rev'd, 249 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 935 (1958).
55. In considering the number of offerees, practitioners should be aware of the
"integration of offerings" concept. The SEC has stated: "A determination whether an
offering is public or private would also include a consideration of the question whether it
should be regarded as a part of a larger offering made or to be made .... A person may not

separate parts of a series of related transactions, the sum total of which is really one
offering, and claim that a particular part is a non-public transaction. Thus, in the case

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss3/4
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Accessibility to Information. As stated in the Ralston decision, the prime
consideration is whether the offerees need the protection afforded by registration. Therefore, the offerees' accessibility to the information disclosed by
registration is a significant factor. 56 Thus, one major problem in determining
the exemption's applicability turns upon the breadth of the term "access
to information."7 Two necessary questions concerning information have
not been adequately answered by the courts and the SEC: May an issuer
merely choose to submit information directly to the offerees and thereby
avoid registration? Must he actually give the information to the offerees or
may he notify them that it is available for their inspection?
The SEC has stated that an issuer may not voluntarily choose to disclose
information and thereby avoid registration, since this would enable it to
issue securities without regard to the standards and sanctions of the Act. 58
If the purpose of the Act is to ensure disclosure of the requisite information,
which a registration would have required, 59 such reasoning is specious. No
precise answer has been formulated to the question of whether the issuer
must actually send the information to the investor or merely make it
available. The Fourth Circuit has stressed that mere accessibility is sufficient, 60 while a lower federal court has said that the information must be
given to the offerees unless the offeror can prove that such an actual transmission was not needed. 61 Although insurance companies and other institutional investors may demand and receive all necessary information and
thereby enhance the exemption's availability to an offeror, a failure by an
ordinary investor to obtain information that he could have demanded may
preclude the availability of the exemption.62 Thus, while one of the benefits
of the private offering is the ability to keep from disclosing all of the inof offerings of fractional undivided interests in separate oil or gas properties where the
promoters must constantly find new participants for each new venture, it would appear
to be appropriate to consider the entire series of offerings to determine the scope of this
solicitation." SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1961).

56. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). The Court also stated: "An
offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not
involving any public offering.'"
57. A related problem is whether an offeree can be shown able to fend for himself on
a basis other than that of access to the information that registration would disclose. See
Israels, supra note 12.
58. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
59. On the other hand, one commentator has stated: "[N]o matter what information an
issuer may supply to any investor, absent registration, it could not possibly be comparable
to that which comes out of the registration process." Sargent, Private Offering Exemption,
21 Bus. LAw. 118, 120 (1965).
60. United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 850, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 998 (1967). Similarly, in Collier v. Mikel Drilling
Co., 183 F. Supp. 104, 112 (D. Minn. 1958), the court, in finding for the defendant corporation, stated that the purchasers of stock "were all afforded a full opportunity to investigate all of the facts surrounding the investments . . . and all of them were businessmen of mature experience." The court, however, improperly considered only the purchasers
rather than all offerees.
61. Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).
62. See, e.g., Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH
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formation required for registration, the exemption's applicability may turn
on whether such information has not only been disclosed but also received.
Sophistication and Investment Experience of Offerees. The sophistication
and past business experience of the offerees are inherently related to the
determination of whether they have sufficient ability to fend for themselves
and therefore do not require the Act's protection.63 However, the level of
sophistication and experience is not, in itself, determinative and its relative
importance is still in doubt.
Some courts have found offerees to possess such sophisticated business
acumen that affording them an opportunity to thoroughly investigate a
proposed investment is sufficient to establish the offering as private. 64 Under
the proper circumstances this sophistication may be regarded as proof that
the offerees could fend for themselves, making registration unnecessary.6 5
However, information given to sophisticated investors is not by itself sufficient, and the exemption may be denied where there is insufficient access
to the information that registration would have provided.6 6 For example, a
sale of securities in a tax publication was enjoined even though the offerees
were lawyers and accountants, most of whom were subscribers. The court
found that the offerees' background had no bearing on the critical question
respecting their access to the type of information that registration would
disclose.67 Thus, the attainment of sufficient business experience and sophistication may or may not be deemed a substitute for access to required information. However, such experience and sophistication are always relevant to
the offerees' possession of background information, which is integrally related
to their ability to fend for themselves.
Relationship to the Offeror. The relationship between the offeror and
offerees has always been regarded as significant to determine the exemption's
availability.6 s It may be indicative of the offerees' degree of knowledge of

FE. SEc. L. REP. §91,,23, at 94,968-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Failure by an investor to obtain
the information he was in a position to demand is no defense. Id. at 94,970.
63. 2 S. GOLDBER, supra note 50, §4.1 (b) at 4-5; Shea, A Practical Look at the Securities Laws Restrictions on Sales by Owners of Unregistered Stock, 43 U. D-T. L.J. 571, 574

(1966).
64. Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F. Supp. 104, 112 (D. Minn. 1958) (purchasers
were businessmen of mature experience and dealt through friends); Repass v. Rees, 174 F.
Supp. 898, 904 (D. Colo. 1959) (the court indicated the offering would have been private
had all the offerees been experienced businessmen and experienced investors).
65. See 2 S. GoLDBERO, supra note 50, §4.1 (b) at 4-5.
66. United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 350, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 998 (1967). Offerees must have access to
information at the time of purchase, and a failure to satisfy this requirement will not be
excused even if the offerees are sophisticated investors.
67. SEC v. Tax Service, Inc., 357 F.2d 143, 144-45 (1966).
68. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935); see, e.g., Campbell v. Degenther,
97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
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the issuer and of the issue.9 There are no guarantees, however, that identical
relationships will be treated similarly with respect to different offerings.
Offerings to stockholders have been held both public and private depending
upon the other factors involved.70 However, even offerings limited to key
employees do not necessarily require a finding that the offerings are private.'*
The prime consideration is whether the offerees have such a privileged relationship with the offeror that their present knowledge and facilities for
acquiring information make registration unnecessary for their protection .72
Consideration of the relationship between offeror and offeree is not
limited to that relationship existing with the issuer's stockholders or employees. It is material to all offerings. Past business dealings between the
parties,7 3 close acquaintance and friendships74 are also probative. The only
general rule that can be ascertained is that the closer the relationship, the
greater the possibility of sustaining a claim to the exemption's availability.
Other Factors. While the aforementioned criteria constitute several of
the more important factors considered by the SEC and the courts, they are
not the only factors nor even the determinative ones in every case. The
manner in which the offerees are selected may itself be an important consideration.75 An offering to a limited number of persons chosen from the
general public on the basis that they are potential purchasers is generally
deemed a public offering. Conversely, an offering to a larger number of
persons who are all members of a particular class, membership in which may
be determined by the application of a pre-existing standard, is usually
considered a nonpublic offering.76 Hence, the more homogeneous the class
of offerees the more likely a private offering will be found.

69. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC Securities Act Release No.
4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
70. See, e.g., Siebenthaler v. Aircraft Accessories Corp., 2 S.E.C. Judicial Decisions 181
(W.D. Mo. 1940) (issue to three sole stockholders of another corporation for purposes of
securing control held private); accord, SEC v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., 88 F.2d
1018 (6th Cir. 1937). Contra, Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1943);
SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938).
71. E.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (issue only to "key" employees held public); accord, Altman v. American Foods, Inc., 262 N.C. 671, 138 S.E.2d
526 (1964) (involving corporation's restricted stock option plan). For an in-depth analysis
of the relationship between the private offering exemption and employee stock option
plans, see Shea, supra note 63.
72. Note, The Investment-Intent Dilemma in Secondary Transactions,39 N.Y.U.L. Ray.
1043, 1047 (1964).
73. E.g., Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975, 978 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (the fact that
all the offerees had participated with the defendant in previous well-drilling ventures was
significant in determining the issuance to be private). Past business dealings between the
parties also aided the court in Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1963), to find
an offering to be private.
74. Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 159 (6th Cir. 1969) (exemption denied where
only 6 of 78 offerees knew the defendant through business or socially).
75. Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan, 52 F. Supp. 999 (D. Del. 1943).
76. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
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The location of the offerees must also be considered. Geographical diversity among the offerees may indicate the necessity for the disclosure that
registration would entail.7 7 Likewise, the method by which sales are effected
may be important. Utilization of professional salesmen or those specifically
7
employed to promote sales is often determinative. 8
The person initiating the transaction may also be of utmost importance.
One court recently found that "[t]he fact that the investor rather than the
seller initiate[d] the transaction indicates that a private offering is involved." 79
Similarly, any economic inducements held out to the offerees by the offeror
must be considered.8 0
The denomination and quantity of the securities issued is another factor
indicative of the public or private nature of an offering.". "The offering of
many units in small denominations .. .indicates the issuer recognizes the
possibility, if not probability, of public distribution. ' 8 2 Thus, an offering of
a small number of securities in large denominations adheres more closely
83
to the private placement concept.
Finally, a determination must be made as to whether the offering constitutes an isolated sale of securities or is part of a larger offering already made
or to be made. What might be deemed private if viewed alone may be public
when seen as only one part of a series of offerings. 4
Burden of Proof
Myriad factors may be considered by both the courts and SEC before
ruling on the propriety of an alleged private offering. Since some, all, or
none of these factors may be determinative in a particular case, it is incumbent upon the practitioner to anticipate the various interpretations that
may be given to any juxtaposition of facts. These difficulties have been compounded, since the burden of proving the exemption's availability has long
been placed on the one seeking to come within its purview.8 5 Hence, under
77. 2 S.Gowrao, supra note 50, §4.1 (e) at 4-14.
78. Lively v. Hirshfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971) (although the offering was held
public, the court recognized that the sales effort, carried out solely by the corporation's
president and chief stockholder, indicated a private offering); Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d
153, 159 (6th Cir. 1969) (sales effected by agents and salesman held public); SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962) (an issuer's public advertising of an issue or use
of an investment banker would be inconsistent with a private offering).
79. Vicioso v. Watson, 325 F. Supp. 1071, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
80. SEC v. Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Cal. 1960), modified on
other grounds, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
81. Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 118 (10th Cir. 1963) (offer and purchase of a onehalf interest in an oil and gas lease for slightly more than $10,000 held indicative of a
private offering); Rudnick v. Bischoff, 258 App. Div. 608, 17 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Ist Dep't 1940)
(sale of only 65 shares held private).
82. Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880, 884 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
83. Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L. REv. 851, 858
(1959).
84.

See note 55 supra.

85. E.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953); SEC v. Sunbeam Gold
Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1938).
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the guiding principle of Ralston"6 the one seeking the exemption must
prove the lack of public need for disclosure.
Since the offerees constitute the class under scrutiny, the issuer who is
defending against an allegation that he violated the registration provisions
of the Act must be able to offer proof that no need for registration existed
with respect to all offerees, not merely those who happen to be the plaintiffs
in a particular suit 8 1 The issuer must, therefore, retain and be prepared to

offer into evidence all information connected with an offering.
When and Under What Circumstances May the Offerees Sell?
Even after an issuer places its securities with offerees who do not need
the protections afforded by registration, the availability of the exemption
is still not a certainty. The relationship between the private offering exemption
and the exemption provided for "transactions by any person other than an
issuer, underwriter, or dealer"' ' 8 must also be considered.
An underwriter is defined as "any person who has purchased from an
issuer with a view to . . . the distribution of any security ...... 89 In order
to avoid the necessity of registration, the offeree must purchase for investment
reasons only and not with the intent of future resale.
If an offeree purchases with the intent to resell, his sale is not exempt
from the registration requirements of the Act. Moreover, since it would be
inconsistent to assert that an offering to an underwriter is one that does
not involve any public distribution, the issuer will be denied the benefits
of the private offering exemption.90 Otherwise, an issuer could avoid the
desired effects of the Act by selling to an initial group of informed investors
who act as mere conduits for a wider distribution."'
Issuers seeking the exemption must therefore satisfy themselves as to

86. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953); Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp.
898, 903 (D. Colo. 1959).
87. Lively v. Hirshfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971) (although the defendant proved
that all plaintiffs were experienced investors able to fend for themselves and therefore not
in need of the Act's protection, the offering was found public because the defendant failed
to offer such proof with respect to all offerees); accord, Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F.
Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).
88. Securities Act §77d (1).
89. Securities Act §77b (11).
90. Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1943) (issuance of stock to
corporation's president held public because of likelihood of future redistribution). "[m1t is
a fundamental requirement that the offerees of a private placement take for investment
and that premature resale breaks the private placement." United States v. Hill, 298 F.
Supp. 1221, 1230 (D. Conn. 1969). Accord, Hirtenstein v. Tenney, 252 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). Because of the adverse effects that a subsequent sale may have on an alleged private
offering, such sales, if made, are at substantial discounts. Sowards, Private Placements and
Secondary Transactions: The Wheat Report Proposals for Reform, 1970 Durm L.J. 515,
519.
91. Shimer v. Webster, 225 A,2d 880, 884 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
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the investment intent of the offerees.9 2 In order to assure themselves of the
availability of the exemption, issuers have required purchasers of privately
issued securities to execute "investment letters," which are representations
that the purchaser is acquiring for investment purposes only with no view
93
toward resale or other distribution.
Although the investment letter technique is widely employed, it is not
foolproof. Such statements by investors are necessarily self-serving and not
conclusive as to actual intent.9 4 Issuers cannot therefore take buyer assurances
at face value that they purchase for investment only when circumstances
indicate the representations to be more formal than real. 95 Circumstances
may thus render the "letter" of little or no effectY8
Since investment letters are not determinative of a buyer's actual intent,
many issuers have sought to avoid future problems by requiring purchasers
to agree to the placing of a restrictive legend on the face of the security
certificate97 Such legends typically warn prospective purchasers that the
securities were received for investment only and may not be distributed in any
manner in the absence of an effective registration under the 1933 Act or an
opinion by the issuer's counsel that registration is not required.98 As a

92. Should just one of the offerees redistribute his securities in a situation where the
other participants knew or should have known of the probability of resale, the exemption
is inapplicable to the issuer and all purchasers. Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12,
1957). For a detailed discussion of this release see Foosher & McCabe, Private PlacementsResale of Securities: The Crowell-Collier Case, 15 Bus. LAW. 72 (1959). A related problem

involves whether one offeree can sue another offeree for misrepresentation as to his investment intent. One court has indicated that such a suit might be permitted. See Lundquist
v. Turner, 407 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1969).
93. For an in-depth discussion of the problems inherent in the "investment letter" technique see Morrow, The Investment Letter Dilemma and Proposed Rule 144: A Retreat to
Confusion, 11 SA"TA CLARA LAW. 37 (1970).

94. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
95. SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge Consol. Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248, 255 (D. Utah 1958).
96. E.g., Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
(1959) (investment letter of no effect because of offeree's efforts to sell immediately after
purchase); Altman v. American Foods, Inc., 262 N.C. 671, 138 S.E.2d 526 (1964) (investment
letter of no effect because the signor did not clearly understand the nature of his investment
representation). In Murphy v. Royal Am. Indus., Inc., 188 So. 2d 884 (4th D.C.A. Fla.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 953 (1967), the offeree signed an investment letter after
purchasing stock under a contract requiring the issuer to buy back the shares if registration
could not be timely effected. When registration was not accomplished the court, nevertheless,
required the issuer to buy back the stock because the letter did not modify the contract,
was not issued for consideration, and did not operate as a waiver of the offeree's rights
under the contract. See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 8825 (Aug. 12, 1957) (regarding
convertible securities and investment letters).
97. In General Dev. Corp. v. Catlin, 139 So. 2d 901 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962), the court
required the signor of an investment letter to accept securities bearing the following legend:
"These shares have been issued on the condition that they will be held for investment purposes only and not for distribution." Id. at 902.
98. See Morrow, supra note 93, at 40. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODF §8-204, which
provides: "Unless noted conspicuously on the security a restriction on transfer imposed by
the issuer even though otherwise lawful is ineffective except against a person with actual
knowledge of it.'
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backstop to the employment of the restrictive legends, stop transfer notices
are usually placed with the issuer's transfer agent prohibiting transfer of
any securities that bear such a legend. 99 However, it must be stressed that
these measures are precautionary only and may not be regarded as a basis
for securing the exemption's availability.'00
The purchaser of privately issued securities thus faces a hazardous predicament. Once the purchase has been consummated his position may be unalterable - unable to sell his securities without violating the registration
provisions of the Act and unable to come within the purview of any of the
exemptions from registration. Currently, his only available means of demonstrating that his purchase was made with the requisite investment intent
would be to hold the securities for such a length of time that their sale
would not be inconsistent with his investment intent at the time of purchaselo 1 or to prove that his situation has changed in a manner unforeseen
02
at the time of purchase.
The Holding Period. Although an offeree who has the proper investment
intent should not be concerned with a future sale, it would be unrealistic
to assume in every case that he is not contemplating such a sale. One must
therefore consider the length of time he must hold privately issued securities
before a sale would be found consistent with a purchase for investment.
The SEC's official position has been that securities acquired for investment
never lose that character and perhaps may never legitimately be offered for
sale.

°3

In practice, however, sales of securities held for various periods of

time14 are not always condemned. 0 5
While there is no concrete standard, three years or more seems the conservative yardstick for a safe sale.106 Sales after holding securities for less than
two years, however, have almost always been found insufficient,10 7 even
though the SEC originally indicated that holding for only a year would be
presumptive of a purchase for investmentlos

99. See Morrow, supra note 93, at 41.
100. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
101. SEC Securities Act Release No. 1862 (Dec. 14, 1938).
102. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
103. SEC Securities Act Release No. 603 (Dec. 16, 1935); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957). For discussion of this proposition see Note, Secondary Distributions and Broker's Transactions: The Withering of Wheat, 37 BROOKLYN L. REv. 588 (1971).
104. SEC v. Computronic Indus. Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (N.D. Texas 1968) (intent to resell may be presumed from a small lapse of time between purchase and resale).
105. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
106. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAw REPORTS, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS - A REAPPRAISAL OF
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 165-66 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as THE WHEAT REPORT]. The author, a former Commissioner of the SEC, stated
it was his experience that the SEC favors a 3-5 year holding period. Id.
107. E.g., Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
896 (1959) (holding period of 10 months insufficient); accord, Interface Systems, Inc., 1971

CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f77,980; see SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
108. SEC Securities Act Release No. 1862 (Dec. 14, 1938) (ruled that holding for as
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Although some recent indications have implied that a two-year period
would be satisfactory, 09 sales after a two-year period have sometimes been
found inconsistent with an investment intent at the time of purchase. 10
Moreover, where convertible securities are involved, both the convertible
and underlying securities are viewed independently and no tacking of holding periods is permitted."'
As a final consideration, practitioners must realize that the holding period
will not be viewed in isolation. The holding period indicative of investment
intent will vary with changes in the surrounding facts and circumstances.
Change of Circumstances. A second and final means by which an offeree
can sell but reasonably maintain that his sale is consistent with an investment
intent at the time of security acquisition is by showing that his circumstances
have unforeseeably changed since the time of purchase." 2 When relying upon
a change in circumstances to validate a later sale, the length of holding is
not a significant evidentiary factor."13 Accordingly, it is not impossible to
conceive of a situation whereby circumstances have changed to justify a sale
4
soon after the purchase."
As with the holding period problem the SEC has failed to elucidate what
proofs will sustain a finding of an unforeseeable change in circumstances.
It has, however, indicated a reluctance to make such determinations."15
Ordinarily, in order to indicate the proper investment intent, the unanticipated change in circumstances must be personal to the holder rather than

long as a year would create a strong inference that they had been purchased for investment). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).

109. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957) (two-year period presumptive
of investment intent). In United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
the court found a two-year holding period to be "an insuperable obstacle" to finding an intent to distribute. The case, however, involved a charge of criminal contempt, not civil
liability. Its value as a precedent may thus be somewhat diminished.
110. For an egregious example, see Taylor Devices, Inc., 1971 CCH FED. Sc. L. REP.
77,981. In Taylor, convertible debentures were acquired in late 1963 or early 1964. The
purchaser died in 1967. In March 1968 the debenture holders were notified that the
company faced bankruptcy and were requested to exercise their conversion privilege. The

executors of the purchaser's estate converted on August 16, 1968. They were notified in
January 1971 that the holding period at the conversion date was insufficient to establish

an investment intent at the time of purchase. Id.
111.

See SEC Rule 155, 17 C.F.R. §230.155 (1971), which requires that, for convertible

securities issued under the private offering exemption, the underlying securities may not
be issued without registration unless the circumstances are such that the private offering
exemption is also independently available for the issuance of such securities. For a discussion of the private offering problems associated with convertible securities see Gadsby,
Private Placement of Convertible Securities, 15 Bus. LAw. 470 (1960).
112. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).

113. See Note, supra note 103, at 595-96. The rationale of the change of circumstances
theory is that such a change justifies the inference that a proper intent previously existed.
114. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 1862 (Dec. 14, 1938).

115. Note, supra note 103, at 595.
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a mere change in the business fortunes of the issuer or a change in the general
economy. 1 6
An unanticipated, serious illness,' "7 for example, will usually justify the
sale of privately issued securities. The purchase of a home may or may not
be sufficient. 1 8 A decline in the securities' value,"19 however, or heavy expenditures required by the purchaser's business are not changes sufficient
to justify a sale.12O Additionally, an issuer's bankruptcy 21 or even the
offeree's loss of employment 22 have been considered insufficient. Conversely,
a radical change in the nature of the issuer's business"23 or a complete turnover of its management have been regarded as factors indicative of a valid
sale.

24

Hence, the change of circumstances doctrine, as with all other aspects
of the private offering exemption, is inundated by uncertainty and couched
in a maze of doubt. As a practical matter, practitioners are left to their own
ingenuity. Facts must be carefully marshaled to achieve whatever goals are
sought.
EFFORTS BY THE COINMISSION To SOLVE THE PROBLEMS SURROUNDING THE
PRIVATE OFFERING

"No Action" Letters
The SEC has not been oblivious to the problems inherent in the private
offering. For many years it has aided investors and issuers by means of "no
action" letters.

Although the SEC itself will not rule on the propriety of a proposed
issuance or sale, its corporate finance division will, upon request, state
whether SEC action will be recommended if a proposed transaction is

effectuated.12 As a practical matter a letter stating that no action will be

116. E.g., Gilligan, Will 8cCo. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 896 (1959) (an intent to hold only so long as the issuer operates profitably is not
sufficient). A sufficient change of circumstances would exist, for example, where a lawyer
who receives a block of securities of the issuer in payment of legal fees later finds his relationship to the issuer unexpectedly terminated. See Orrick, Non-Public Offerings of Corporate Securities-Limitations on the Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act, 21
U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 16 (1959).
117. Orrick, supra note 116, at 16; accord, Comment, How Long Must I Hold?, 25 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 173, 179 (1970).
118. Meer, The Private Offering Exemption Under Federal Securities Act-A Study in
Administrative and Judicial Construction, 20 Sw. L.J. 503, 520 (1966). See also Product
Applications, Inc., 1971 CCH FFD. SEC. L. REP. 177,983 (expansion of home held not to be
a sufficient change of circumstances).
119. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
120. See Comment, supra note 117, at 179.
121. Taylor Devices, Inc., 1971 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,981.
122. Interface Systems, Inc., 1971 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f77,980; Product Applications,
Inc., 1971 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,983.
123. See Comment, supra note 117, at 179.
124. Id.
125. See Meer, supra note 118, at 509.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

15

1972]

Florida Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1972], Art. 4

A PRIMER ON PRIVATE OFFERINGS

recommended is viewed as sufficient protection to proceed with the transaction even though the letter is without legal effect and does not bind the
SEC.1 28 The letter is also without effect against claims by an offeree that
registration should have been required. 1 27 In recent years requests for no
action letters have greatly increased, 128 and the SEC has sought other alternatives.
The Wheat Report
Due to the general dissatisfaction that developed in connection with the
operation of the securities laws, the SEC in 1967 undertook its own study to
determine whether improvements in administration of the laws could be
facilitated internally. A small study group headed by former Commissioner
Francis M. Wheat evaluated SEC operations, positions, and interpretations
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The report was published in the spring of
1969.12 It concluded that the present emphasis on investment intent results
in unacceptable uncertainty and administrative difficulty. 30 Consequences
of the present emphasis on intent include: (1) the promulgation of vague
and imprecise standards; (2) an increasing number of requests for interpretive advice and no action letters; (3) substantial inconsistency in the advice
given by counsel; (4) wide leeway for the unscrupulous; and (5) formidable
problems of proof.'2 1
On the basis of its study, the group urged the promulgation of certain
new rules. In September 1969 the SEC adopted the recommendations of the
132
study group and proposed a new set of rules.

The 160 Series
The 160 series of rules was designed, among other things, 13 3 to establish
relatively precise guidelines as to when and how recipients of privately
offered securities could resell publicly without registration. 13 4 In essence, the
rules provided that, within certain limits, 135 the private offerees could resell
shares of corporations subject to the reporting rules of the Securities and

126. Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering:Hazards for the Unwary, 45 VA. L. REv. 869,
873 (1959). It is imperative that all facts be presented in the request for a "no action"
letter and that, if the letter is issued, the proposed facts be scrupulously complied with.
127. 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 12850.095.
128. SEC SusmmARY op DISCLOSURE POLICy STUDY REP. 6 (1969).
129. THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 106.
130. SEC SUMMARY or DIscLOsURE POLICY STUDY REP. 6 (1969).
131. See THm WHEAT REPORT, supra note 106, at 174-77.
132. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 10, 1969).
133. The 160 series of rules also dealt with when and how a person in control of
issuers could sell securities without registration. Id.
134. Id.
135. Generally, the amount of securities that could be sold by an offeree without registration was to be limited to 1% of the issuer's outstanding shares. Such quantity could
be distributed only once within any six-month period. Id.
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Exchange Act of 1934136 after holding period of one year. 13 7 For a resale of
the securities of non-reporting firms, a five-year holding period, during
which the corporation was financially stable, 138 was required. 39
Thus, the 160 series of rules eliminated the necessity of evaluating subjective factors in order to determine the propriety of a resale. In addition to
this consequent objectivity, the rules were consistent with the disclosure intent of the 1933 Act. 140 It was therefore not surprising that the proposed rules
met with almost unanimous approval from practitioners and commentators'41 What was surprising, however was the SEC's decision not to adopt
4 3
the 160 series.14 - Instead, a new rule was proffered.
Rule 144
The SEC's new proposal seeks to cope with the investment intent problem by means of a definitional presumption. If the securities received by
a private offeree are paid for in full and held for a minimum of eighteen
months; if the issuer is currently complying or will comply with certain
disclosure requirements; and if only a limited quantity of securities is sold
through the usual or customary brokerage transaction, then the offeree will
44
be presumed not to be an underwriter as that term is currently defined.1
If the proposed rule is adopted, the SEC intends to retain the change in
45
circumstances doctrine but abolish the issuance of no action letters.
Adoption of rule 144 would place private offerees in a quandary equal
to that encountered under existing law. Although the stated objective of the
136. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78ii (1970).
137. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 10, 1969).
138. To be regarded as financially stable the rule required the non-reporting issuer
to have had annual gross operating revenues of at least $250,000 during each year of a
period of five consecutive years. Id.
139. For analyses of the 160 series of rules see Morrow, supra note 93. See also Wander,
Proposed Rule 144, 3 REVIEW OF SECURITIES REGuLATIONS 843 (Nov. 5, 1970); Note, supra
note 103.
140. Morrow, supra note 93, at 44; Note, supra note 103, at 604.
141. See note 139 supra.
142. Reasons inferred for not adopting the 160 series included: (1)the holding period
was believed to be too short (the new proposed rule requires a holding period of at
least 18 months); (2) the SEC felt it would be unable to prepare and maintain a list of
reporting companies and those meeting various financial requirements; (3) the five-year
holding period, when coupled with the minimum gross revenue requirement, was found
unduly prejudicial to small issuers; (4) the SEC felt the proposed 160 rules lent themselves
to unscrupulous manipulation by the unsavory investor; and (5) it has been suggested
that the 160 series would have severely limited SEC discretion. See Note, supra note 103,
at 605-07.
143. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5087 (Sept. 22, 1970).
144. Id. For detailed discussions and evaluations of proposed rule 144, see authorities
cited in note 139 supra. See also Rice, Potential Effects of Pending Securities and Exchange
Commission Rules on Private Financing and Business Acquisitions, 23 STAN. L. REv. 287
(1971); Wheat, Some Thoughts on Rule-Making and Proposed SEC Rule 144, 26 RECORD
OF N.Y. CITY B. Ass'N 240 (1971). For definition of the term "underwriter" see text accompanying note 89 supra.
145. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5087 (Sept. 22, 1970).
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rule is certainty,146 its adoption would produce the opposite effect. By setting forth presumptions rather than objective standards, certainty is greatly
inhibited. Moreover, by retaining the change of circumstances doctrine but
abolishing no action letters, offerees would be forced to operate under great
risk - precluded from determining whether their actions are violative of
the 1933 Act. Response to the proposal has thus been overwhelmingly adverse. 147 Consequently, adoption of rule 144 in its present form seems
doubtful.
CONCLUSION

The private offering exemption from the registration requirements of
the 1983 Securities Act is both desirable and beneficial to many issuers of
securities. Its utilization has increased rapidly over the years.
As a concomitant of its growth, however, and due to the lack of statutory
precision, its availability in many cases is extremely uncertain, contingent
upon each variation in the facts surrounding an issuance. Even after the
securities have been issued, a private offering may be reclassified dependent
upon the actions of the offerees. As a result, practitioners and the SEC have
been inundated by requests for advice and interpretive rulings.
The SEC, although very much aware of the problem, has only recently
sought amelioration. Although its proposals in the area indicate a desire
to take positive action, the rule, as proposed, has little remedial effect. Moreover, the SEC's efforts have centered solely upon secondary distributions,
doing little to aid the initial issuer's escape from its maze of uncertainty.
Practitioners must therefore be alert and flexible. It is the rare fact
situation that will permit an unequivocal answer. Not only must each fact
and its relationship to every other fact be analyzed, but sufficient information
capable of demonstrating an issuer's relationship to purchasers and all others
who may be brought within the category of offerees must also be maintained.
Only by such careful planning can an issuer enhance its chances of obtaining
an exempt issuance and thereby achieve the objectives of the 1983 Act.
STEPHEN F. GERTZMAN

146. Id.
147. See note 144 supra.
EDrroR's NoTE: On January 11, 1972, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted

a modified version of proposed rule 144, effective April 15, 1972. The revised rule 144 differs
in several respects from the proposed rule. Many of the changes were made in response to
commentators' suggestions on the proposed rule. For a complete statement and explanation
of the new rule, see SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972).
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